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TAXES AS PANDEMIC CONTROLS
Ashley C. Craig and James R. Hines Jr.

Tax policy can play important roles in limiting the spread of communicable disease
and in managing the economic fallout of a pandemic. Taxes on business activities
that bring workers or customers into close contact with each other offer efficient
alternatives to broad regulatory measures, such as shutdowns, that have been
effective but enormously costly. Corrective taxation also helps raise the revenue
required to cover elevated government expenditure during a pandemic. Moreover,
the restricted consumer choice that accompanies a pandemic reduces the welfare
cost of raising tax revenue from higher-income taxpayers, making it a good time
for deficit closure. Current U.S. tax measures serve some of these functions, but
additional measures could further limit the spread of disease while also addressing
government budget deficits.
Keywords: taxation, externalities, COVID-19
JEL Codes: H21, H23, H24, H25, H62, I18

I. INTRODUCTION

I

n the dramatic months of early 2020, the United States and many other countries
abruptly shut down their economies in efforts to prevent widespread contagion and
disease due to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The monetary cost of these economic shutdowns
was enormous, as the world adopted various drastic expedients in order to gain time
to allow health care systems and the organization of workplaces and public spaces to
adjust to the new reality.
The experience of early 2020 prompts consideration of methods that might be used to
limit the spread of disease in economies that are operating more or less normally. This
paper evaluates the function that routine tax policy serves in limiting the spread of contagious diseases, and how tax policy might be designed to play more active and efficient
roles in controlling the externality generated by activities that spread such diseases.
In crisis situations, it is natural to turn to administrative restrictions based on levels
of potentially harmful activity, and that is what much of the world did in early 2020.1

1

These measures are studied by Lin and Meissner (2020) for the United States. A summary has also been compiled
by Keystone Strategy: https://www.keystonestrategy.com/coronavirus-covid19-intervention-dataset-model/.
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In anything other than a severe crisis, however, the potential economic benefits of taxbased externality control are apparent. Tax incentives can be designed to serve many
if not all of the same functions as regulatory restrictions and to do so more efficiently
in many cases.2 Prior to the appearance of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, climate change was
the global problem capturing much of the world’s attention. While there is considerable controversy over the most efficient method of addressing climate change, many
thoughtful observers prefer carbon taxes to regulatory alternatives because carbon taxes
afford degrees of flexibility and adjustment to heterogeneous situations that administrative rules often lack.3 The features that make carbon taxes cost-effective methods of
reducing carbon emissions similarly have the potential to make appropriately designed
taxes efficient methods of contagion control.
Disease externalities differ from climate change externalities in many respects, most
notably in that many individuals whose actions might put others at risk also thereby put
themselves at risk. Whereas the harm that an individual does to herself by contributing
to global warming may be vanishingly small, the same is not true of reckless behavior
in the face of community disease spread. Corrective actions on the part of governments
can expand on self-interest on the part of individuals and firms to help avoid some of
the more adverse potential consequences.4
Efficient government policy measures that limit the spread of disease can include
taxes that impose marginal costs on externality-generating activities such as employment in close quarters. Existing personal and corporate income taxes, social insurance
systems, and other tax policies serve some of these externality-correcting functions,
albeit rather indirectly and crudely. Existing taxes can readily be modified to address
disease externalities more directly, though a truly first best externality correction would
require a thorough overhaul of the tax system that addresses both supply and demand
of externality-generating activities. By contrast, simply shutting down an economy is
a very inefficient method of controlling the spread of disease.
In practice, any system is unlikely to be able to tailor taxes and regulations to control
externalities perfectly — and the controls themselves can distort resource allocation. As
a result, restoring a semblance of efficiency requires that additional corrective measures
accompany externality controls. One example is that efforts to control the actions of firms
can entail taxes or penalties that discourage firm operations and, therefore, inefficiently
2

3

4

A growing literature studies optimal policy responses to SARS-CoV-2 with a focus on administrative
restrictions. Examples include Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020), Atkeson (2020), Bodenstein, Corsetti,
and Guerrieri (2020), Chari, Kirpalani, and Phelan (2020), Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2020), Glover
et al. (2020), Guerrieri et al. (2020), Jones, Philippon, and Venkateswaran (2020), Moser and Yared (2020),
and Rampini (2020). In some cases, consumption taxation is used as a proxy for quantitative containment
measures (Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt, 2020; Krueger, Uhlig, and Xie, 2020).
There is a large literature, prompted by Weitzman (1974), on the choice between price and quantity instruments to control externalities. This includes Laffont (1977), Spence (1977), and Newell and Pizer (2003).
The externalities involved in disease transmission were extensively studied well before the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic. See, for example, Goldman and Lightwood (2002) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2004).
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reduce economic activity. An efficient system of externality-controlling taxes, therefore,
may need to include subsidies or other devices to encourage employment and output.
Governments must balance their budgets over time, though not necessarily every year;
in periods of economic emergency, governments commonly run large budget deficits.
There remains the question of the extent to which government budget deficits are warranted at different times. During a pandemic, portions of the population can experience
severe hardship and require resource transfers to maintain even minimum levels of
welfare, while other parts of the population and economy, though underperforming
relative to normal conditions, are nonetheless capable of funding these transfers. In
such circumstances, it is far from clear that large, or even any, government deficits are
warranted since the cost of extracting taxes from the part of the economy capable of
paying them may be lower during a pandemic than in the future.
Sections II and III of the paper analyze the use of taxes to support efficient control
of externalities, with Section II focusing on individual taxes and Section III exploring
taxes on firms. Section IV of the paper considers the implications of disease-driven
economic upheaval for government budget deficits. Section V identifies the extent to
which existing U.S. taxes and social insurance programs address the externalities created by disease spread. Section VI provides the conclusion.
II. EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT EXTERNALITY CONTROL
One of the characteristics of disease externality is that individuals who transmit the
disease also are at risk of experiencing severe outcomes themselves. Suppose that the
expected utility of individual i can be represented as
(1)

ui (ci , Li ,Δ i (Li ,di ,ei )),

in which ci is consumption; Li is labor supply; and Di is the probability of catching the
disease, itself a function of labor supply. In this specification, individuals control their
own exposure to disease by adjusting their labor supplies. In addition to labor supply,
the probability of catching the disease is also a function of the safety of an individual’s
workplace environment, denoted ei , and the extent of disease in individual i’s proximity
but outside the workplace (e.g., at grocery stores or other necessary activities), denoted
di . The utility specification in Equation (1) takes nonwork disease exposure, di , to be
exogenous, a restriction that is relaxed in Section II.C.
Individuals choose labor supply mindful of the budget constraint
(2)

ci ≤ wi Li + mi − T (wi Li ,mi ),

in which wi is individual i’s pretax wage, mi is her nonlabor income and other resources
(not all of which may be taxable), and T(wi Li , mi) is the tax obligation associated with
these levels of labor and nonlabor income. Denoting labor income by yi = wi Li , the
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first-order condition corresponding to positive labor supply that maximizes Equation
(1) subject to Expression (2) is
(3)

⎛ ∂T ( yi ,mi ) ⎞
∂u / ∂Li ∂ui / ∂Δ i ∂Δ i
=− i
wi ⎜ 1−
+
.
⎟
∂ yi
∂ui / ∂ci ∂ui / ∂ci ∂Li
⎝
⎠

The first term on the right side of Equation (3) is standard in labor supply: in the absence
of any additional costs or restrictions, a worker chooses labor supply to equate the
after-tax wage with the cost of foregone leisure, normalized by the marginal utility of
consumption. The second term on the right side of Equation (3) reflects the expected
health cost associated with an additional hour of labor supply, as it is the product of
the normalized cost of illness and the extent to which an additional unit of labor supply
increases the probability of becoming infected. While strictly speaking the derivation
of Equation (3) applies only to individuals who can choose to supply any amount of
labor, even those facing inflexible job schedules will make discontinuous choices of
whether to work based on the same trade-offs between the benefits of compensation
and the costs of foregone leisure plus the risk of disease.
Labor supply decisions corresponding to Equation (3) are extremely unlikely to
maximize social welfare, since individuals disregard their own effects on others. The
specification in Equation (3) calls attention to two such spillover effects that are notable
by their absence: an individual’s labor supply affects aggregate tax collection and it
affects the likelihood that others will catch the disease. These spillovers work in opposite
directions: the tax externality implies that labor supply will be too low, whereas the
disease externality implies that labor supply will be too high.
A. Improving Efficiency
Greater labor supply on the part of individual i increases the chance that nearby others
catch the disease by affecting the extent of disease in their areas. The aggregate welfare
effect of an additional unit of i’s labor supply is given by
(4)

∂u j ⎛ ∂Δ j ∂d j ∂Δ j ∂e j ⎞
+
⎜
⎟.
∂d j ∂Li ∂e j ∂Li ⎠
j ⎝

∑ ∂Δ
j≠i

Since ∂uj /∂∆j < 0, and the parenthetical term is positive, Expression (4) is negative,
the government can support efficient labor supply by imposing a marginal tax equal
in magnitude to Expression (4); this causes i to exactly internalize the impact of her
labor supply on the probability that others catch the disease. The first-order condition
(Equation (3)) includes an income tax at marginal rate ∂T (yi, mi)/∂yi , but only by chance
would this marginal tax rate equal the value of Expression (4). Furthermore, any existing
income tax may have been designed to achieve other aims such as redistribution. In that
case, the disease externality provides a motive to raise the marginal tax rate further.5
5

If labor supply is the only activity that generates the externality, the correction for this can simply be added
to the component of the tax that serves other purposes such as redistribution (Sandmo, 1975; Kopczuk,
2003).
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When setting such a corrective tax, the external impact of individual i’s labor supply
is evaluated at its equilibrium level. This introduces an interaction between the potential
cost of an individual’s own exposure and the external cost from exposing others. An
individual’s own risk of exposure likely reduces their desired labor supply during a
pandemic, thus partially mitigating the externality without government intervention.
While this does not change the formula describing the externality correction as represented in Expression (4), this voluntary labor supply reduction changes the magnitude
of the implied externality-correcting tax. For example, if an individual’s workplace
is already less crowded because many colleagues choose to work less or work from
home, the externality is diminished compared to what it would have been if they were
all commuting to work, and the externality-correcting tax rate is correspondingly lower.
Since income taxes are functions of income rather than amounts of labor, a flat or
progressive income tax would be poorly targeted from the standpoint of discouraging
aggregate labor supply during a pandemic. Instead, the fact that higher earners supply less labor per dollar of income suggests that the increase in optimal marginal tax
rates is smaller at higher incomes. It also suggests that increasing the generosity of
unemployment insurance could be a better-targeted policy, since it crowds out labor
supply specifically at lower incomes (Ganong, Noel, and Vavra, 2020). Of course, this
does not take into account differences in the occupations of people with higher and
lower incomes or externalities from the consumption activities they engage in with the
income they earn.
B. The Shutdown Alternative
One regulatory alternative to tax adjustments is to shut down the economy entirely,
in which case Li = 0, ∀i. Under these circumstances, individual i’s utility is given by
ui(ei, 0, Di(0, di, ei)). It is clear in this scenario that a worker’s chance of contracting the
disease is unaffected by their employer’s level of workplace protection, ei , since no one
works. But someone who does not work might nonetheless catch the disease, as there
can be unavoidable exposure while engaged in everyday activities such as shopping.
Community disease proclivity, di , can therefore affect ∆i even though labor supply is zero.
As an instructive benchmark, it is useful to start by considering a stark example in
which the only way for an individual to catch the disease is through workplace exposure. Under these circumstances, ∆i is independent of di if Li = 0: greater community
disease prevalence has no effect on the likelihood that an individual will contract the
disease if they do not work. Effectively, the individual is immunized by staying at home.
Under this assumption, if only one person in the economy worked, there would be no
externality associated with their labor supply since there would be no one else at work
to infect. A tax correction based on Expression (4) would therefore be zero, because the
value of Expression (4) is zero. This does not imply that there is no role for government
intervention. Indeed, price-based externality correction measures can improve welfare
even here. But a complete shutdown in this example is inefficient, because it imposes
externality control even to the point at which the externality disappears.
An interesting aspect of this scenario is that a complete shutdown produces an outcome that is Pareto inferior even to the very inefficient alternative of no government
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action at all.6 Start with individual utility, which is given by Equation (1). Maximizing
Equation (1), individual i chooses labor supply L*i . Similarly, the equilibrium levels of
workplace protection and community disease proclivity in the absence of government
intervention are e*i and d*i , respectively. Since zero labor supply is always an option,
every individual must weakly prefer to supply L*i so that ui(ci, L*i , Di(L*i , d*i , e*i )) ≥ ui(ci,
0, Di(0, d*i , e*i )). Finally, since utility is independent of di and ei when Li = 0, it follows
that ui(ci, L*i , Di(L*i , d*i , e*i )) ≥ ui(ci, 0, Di(0, di , ei )) for any di and ei. Consequently, forcing everyone to have zero labor supply cannot make anyone better off and, as a general matter, will make some worse off. This strong conclusion holds regardless of the
values individuals place on personal infection risk, their risk aversion, or the value of
a statistical life. Intuitively, the reason why this result obtains is that there are only two
types of workers in this example: (1) those who would not have supplied labor anyway,
who are thus indifferent to the shutdown; and (2) those who would have supplied labor
despite the risk of catching the disease, who are now weakly worse off because they
are prevented from doing so.
To be clear, this conclusion relies not only on individual rationality but also on the
assumption that individuals are entirely unaffected by community disease prevalence
(di) if they do not supply any labor. The latter is overly strong, since individuals are
exposed to disease through their consumption, health care, and receipt of support in
rest homes and other venues, and are in other ways unable to protect themselves fully
from disease exposure simply by not working for pay. Furthermore, even the most
complete economic shutdown is not fully complete, as essential workers continue to
provide services. Incorporating these realities removes the very strong Pareto-inferiority
property of economic shutdowns, because even individuals who are themselves isolated
then benefit from others reducing their labor supplies. But the example highlights the
potential disadvantages of sustaining blunt quantitative restrictions as a solution to a
disease externality.
C. Application to Other Economic Activities
While the model in this section treats an individual’s nonwork activities as though
they are exogenous from the standpoint of externality control, the model’s implications
apply in straightforward fashion to broader formulations that treat consumption activities explicitly. It is clearly possible, indeed easy, to catch and transmit disease while
shopping for goods or consuming services. Since consumers prefer to avoid getting
sick, sellers of goods and services have incentives to modify their operations to reduce
the risks that their customers face, in return for which they can charge higher prices. As
in the workplace environment, the induced incentive for disease mitigation is limited
by the external nature of a portion of the costs. Since customers do not bear the full
costs of their actions, in that they do not internalize the costs they impose on unrelated
6

This argument draws on the work of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991), which analyzes the welfare
consequences of compulsory vaccinations.
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parties via their own disease transmission, the incentives facing firms from which
they purchase goods and services will not support efficient outcomes, leaving scope
for efficiency-enhancing taxes or regulations. In principle, these taxes and regulations
could be tailored to reflect the risks of different activities.
III. EMPLOYER TAXES
The externality identified in Section II arises because individuals choose labor supply without regard to their own effects on the welfares of others. The analysis takes
as fixed any efforts on the part of employers to control contagion in their workplaces.
However, the government can influence these employer control efforts, perhaps only
very imperfectly, with either taxes or regulations. This section considers the design of
efficient firm incentives and how they interact with other policies that might accompany
them. A technical elaboration of the model, and derivation of results, is available in
Appendix A.
Consider an economy with competitive firms. Each has a decreasing-returns production function q(L, K), in which L is the firm’s labor input and K its capital input.
Economic profits, p , are given by
(5)

π = (1− τ ){q(L, K ) − [w + (1− α )x]L}− ρ K − α xL,

in which τ is the profit tax rate and r the (nondeductible) opportunity cost of capital
invested.7 The firm spends x per worker to limit the spread of disease in the workplace,
the benefit of which (to the firm) is that its employees are willing to work for a lower
wage in a safer workplace. A fraction a of expenditures on x is nondeductible, being
in the nature of capital expenditures on new equipment and reconfiguring buildings;
the remaining fraction (1 – a) constitutes business expenses that can be immediately
deducted from taxable income.
Workers care about their total payoffs per hour worked, w + f (x), with f '(x) > 0
reflecting that workers value both their monetary wages and firms’ mitigation efforts
(x). The labor market affords a firm the opportunity to hire as many workers as it needs,
providing that total worker payoff per hour equals or exceeds a fixed outside option,
w0. Assuming that the marginal benefit to expenditure on mitigation is positive but
diminishing, there is a unique privately optimal level of mitigation by each firm, x*,
and a corresponding wage demanded by workers, w = w0 – f (x* ). In addition, there is a
negative health externality due to community disease transmission. The magnitude of
this aggregate health externality, h(L, x), increases with employment, L, and declines
with firm per-worker mitigation efforts, x.
7

This specification of the tax treatment of capital expenditures ignores the availability of depreciation
allowances. This is for simplicity; inclusion of depreciation allowances does not change the implications
of the model.
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The sole purpose of the profit tax in this example is to correct for the health externality from SARS-CoV-2.8 The optimal level of the tax is given by

(6)

τ
=
1− τ

∂h(L, x)
∂h(L, x)
εLL +
εxx
∂L
∂x
,
ρε K K + αε xL xL

in which ε L ≡

dL (1− τ )
is the firm’s elasticity of demand for labor with respect to
d(1− τ ) L

the after-tax rate; eK and ex are analogous elasticities of demand for capital expenditures
and per-worker mitigation efforts, respectively; and exL is the elasticity of total mitigation spending, xL, with respect to the after-tax rate.
Profit taxation (or subsidization) can help correct for the negative externality from
employment and the positive externality from mitigation. Whether profits are optimally
taxed or subsidized depends on how labor supply and mitigation respond. Higher tax
rates may exacerbate the externality by reducing per-worker spending on mitigation
(ex > 0). Thus, a profit subsidy is warranted if labor demand does not respond (eL =
0). But higher taxes presumably reduce total employment, since the reduced scale of
firm operations is likely to depress labor demand more than labor-capital substitution
increases it. If this labor demand response is large enough to outweigh the distortion of
spending on mitigation, Equation (6) suggests that a profit tax is optimal.
The need for profit taxation is reduced to the extent that employment is directly taxed
or firm mitigation efforts directly subsidized. For example, consider an extreme case in
which (1) an employment tax is set optimally to internalize the health externality from
labor supply and (2) firm mitigation efforts are optimally subsidized (or enforced via
regulation). In this case, there is no net wedge between the marginal benefits and costs
of labor supply and disease mitigation by firms. No profit tax is then warranted for the
purpose of externality correction. Corrective policy such as that described by Equation
(6) is beneficial only to the extent that other, more direct, methods of externality control
are unavailable or too costly to use.
In practice, firms are also encouraged to take steps to mitigate the spread of the
disease by the threat that they will be penalized if their workers contract it. This has
motivated proposals for a liability shield for businesses (Cowen and Mitchell, 2020).
While a liability shield would be counterproductive from the point of view of externality correction, these proposals do highlight an important point: the threat of penalties
causes even the most responsible business owners to be fearful of reopening. For this
reason, measures such as profit or wage subsidization could be warranted to encourage
employment and economic activity.
8

If there are other motives for profit taxation, this externality correction should be weighed together with
these other concerns, just as was the case for the labor tax discussed above.
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IV. NOW AND THEN
The financial costs of the Covid-19 pandemic are immense, affecting all parts of the
economy, including the government. The economic contraction associated with the
pandemic significantly reduces tax revenues while greatly increasing desired government spending (Congressional Budget Office, 2020). The resulting government budget
imbalance raises the question of the extent to which governments should borrow to
finance rising spending. The analysis above suggests that certain taxes help correct
for health externalities during the pandemic and, therefore, should be set higher than
otherwise. While these higher taxes would also help balance the government budget,
actually closing the budget shortfalls would require much more aggressive action if
the economy and potential tax revenue remain depressed due to the actual and feared
effects of the virus.
Large government deficits have the effect of reallocating consumption from the future
to the present, whereas deficit closure does the opposite.9 The benefit of transferring
consumption from the future to the present depends on how the pandemic affects the
relative values of consumption, and therefore income, at different times. Expressing aggregate welfare as ū(c, L, D), and taking individuals to be at interior solutions
with respect to consumption, the value of an additional dollar of aggregate income
1 ∂u (c, L,Δ)
is
, in which p̂ is the aggregate consumer price index and marginal
p̂
∂c
consumption is divided equally among all s individuals in society:
(7)

∂u (c, L,Δ) 1 s ∂ui (ci , Li ,Δ i )
= ∑
.
s i=1
∂c
∂ci

Importantly, the optimal timing of aggregate consumption is distinct from the desirability
of redistribution, which can be achieved by cross-sectional redistribution of resources. It
is clear that segments of society that are hardest hit by the health and economic fallout
from the pandemic require significant financial support in the form of various types of
transfers. From the standpoint of government finance, however, the key question is how
the value of marginal consumption has changed for those higher-income taxpayers who
would effectively pay any tax increases used to reduce deficits.
An important feature of a pandemic environment is that the availability of some
consumption goods becomes severely limited. For example, high-risk activities, such
as exercising in gyms and travel for leisure, are greatly restricted or banned altogether.
Similarly, many stores stock out of goods, such as freezers and luxury food items, and
still other goods remain available but at much higher than usual cost. Moreover, the
net benefit of partaking in a wide variety of activities involving other people is reduced
due to health risks that cannot be eliminated.
9

This presumes the absence of complete Ricardian equivalence of the form described by Barro (1974).
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Disease-induced disruption of this kind reduces the marginal value of consumption.
The reason is simple and robust: the potential benefits of spending increase with the
available options, so restricting these options reduces the per-dollar value of expenditures. This feature is an implication of basic consumer theory, but it is nonetheless
useful to see it in an example.10 Suppose that aggregate utility is additively separable
in consumption and other components and is given by
σ

(8)

⎛ N σ −1 ⎞ σ −1
u (c, L,Δ) = ⎜ ∑ q j σ ⎟ + u * (L,Δ),
⎝ j=1
⎠

in which qj is aggregate consumption of commodity j and s > 1 is a parameter of the
utility function that reflects consumer love of variety. Consumers choose among N different commodities, the units of which are normalized so that the price of each one is p.
1 ∂u (c, L,Δ)
The marginal benefit of a dollar of income in this example is
, with
p
∂c
1
∂u (c, L,Δ)
(9)
= N σ −1 .
∂c
Since s > 1, the right side of Equation (9) is increasing in N, which implies that the
utility produced by an extra dollar of consumption uniformly increases as more goods
become available. Furthermore, the marginal utility of income decreases as goods
become more expensive. The effect of N on the marginal utility of consumption reflects
that individuals have the option of maintaining the same basket of consumption goods
as more become available, but they prefer instead to consume some of any newly available good, which in turn raises the value of each dollar of spending. The opposite is
true when goods cease to be available.
This logic suggests one reason why it may be beneficial for governments to limit
their budget deficits during pandemics: among upper-income taxpayers, restrictions
on consumption reduce the welfare costs of meeting heavier tax obligations. This, of
course, should be weighed jointly with many other concerns, such as the need for greater
health expenditures and income support programs for those at greatest economic risk.
Furthermore, the timing of government taxation and expenditure may play an important
role in macroeconomic stabilization. These considerations are important but so too is
the benefit of raising tax revenue in the least costly way, given that governments must
pay their bills eventually.
V. TAXES TO THE RESCUE
The U.S. tax system creates strong behavioral incentives. This was true prior to the
advent of Covid-19 and remains so during the course of widespread transmission of the
disease. As it happens, many of the incentives created by the U.S. tax system discourage activities that are responsible for disease transmission. Most obviously, an income
10

This example, and the associated “love of variety” result, derives from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). See
Appendix B for technical details.
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tax discourages the production of income, and since income is commonly produced in
settings that facilitate disease transmission, the tax system in this way rather coincidentally reduces the potential for the spread of disease. Similarly, consumption taxes
discourage consumption activities, which may also contribute to disease transmission.
These situational benefits reduce the net social cost of taxation and suggest that higher
taxes — presumably adopted on a temporary basis with expiring provisions — might
be warranted simply on the basis of externality control.
Table 1 identifies several of the U.S. federal tax provisions that most significantly
affect disease transmission. The top left column lists provisions that affect labor supply,
starting with the individual income tax and federal social insurance taxes. These measures

Table 1
Federal Tax Measures and Their Behavioral Incentives
Labor Supply Incentives

Density Incentives

Personal income tax

Absence of income tax cost of living adjustment
for urban areas

Social insurance taxes

Opportunity Zones

Social Security retirement incentives

Cap on state/local tax deductions

Unemployment insurance

College tuition credits and 529 plans

Mandatory taxable pension
distributions

Exclusion of employer-paid transportation fringe
benefits

Earned Income Tax Credit

Exclusion of employer-provided onsite gym
benefits

Fringe benefit exclusions

Favorable treatment of owner-occupied housing

Excise taxes

Home office deduction

Labor Demand Incentives

Health Incentives

Corporate income tax

Medical expense deduction

Taxation of pass-through business
income

Exclusion of employer-provided medical
insurance

Expensing and accelerated
depreciation of equipment
expenditures

Credit for providing paid family and medical
leave

Work Opportunity Tax Credit

Exclusion of military health benefits
ACA premium subsidies
Health savings accounts

Note: The table identifies existing U.S. federal tax provisions that create incentives for behavior that
affects disease transmission and treatment.
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reduce marginal returns to working, thereby reducing labor supply notwithstanding their
partially offsetting income effects. Federal excise taxes have similar effects on labor
supply, albeit of smaller magnitude, by reducing the purchasing power of labor earnings.
The retirement incentives created by Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance have
the effect of reducing labor supply by a portion of the population that is particularly
vulnerable to disease transmission. Unemployment insurance taxes and benefits likewise discourage labor supply, as do mandatory 401(k), 403(b), and IRA distributions
that push elderly recipients into higher marginal income tax rate brackets. The Earned
Income Tax Credit increases labor force participation, but it has an ambiguous effect
on total hours of labor supply, increasing labor supply by recipients with lower taxable
incomes and reducing labor supply by recipients with higher incomes. And there are
federal tax provisions, such as the exclusion from taxable income of certain employerprovided fringe benefits, including health insurance, pension contributions, and on-site
and miscellaneous fringe benefits, which effectively reduce the taxation of marginal
income and thereby stimulate greater labor supply.
The federal tax provisions noted in the lower left panel of Table 1 have the effect of
generally reducing labor demand on the part of firms. The corporate income tax and the
pass-through taxation of the incomes of partnerships, LLCs, subchapter S corporations,
proprietorships, and other business forms discourage business investment and growth,
and thereby reduce their demand for labor. Table 1 identifies partially offsetting federal
tax provisions, including the rapid depreciation (and in some cases immediate expensing) of equipment expenditures and the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, that encourage
equipment investment and the hiring of certain categories of workers. But the net effect
of federal tax provisions on labor demand, as on labor supply, is to discourage employment. This aspect of federal taxation, long thought to be an inefficient distortion, may
have an externality-correcting function in the presence of disease transmission.
The top right panel of Table 1 lists federal tax measures that affect population density
and thereby influence the spread of disease. The first is the absence of cost of living
adjustments in the income tax, which effectively discourages location and employment in
high-cost, high-wage dense urban areas by pushing residents into higher marginal income
tax rate brackets. While the absence of cost of living adjustment in the federal income tax
is not explicitly location based, the benefits of federal opportunity zones are, though the
net effect on density is a function of the extent to which states designate urban and rural
areas as being eligible for opportunity zone benefits. The cap on the availability of state
and local tax deductions discourages location (and labor supply) in high-tax states and
cities, which tend to be more densely populated than other parts of the country. Favorable
tax treatment of college expenses through tuition tax credits and 529 plans encourages
college attendance, with all of its accompanying student density. The exclusion under the
federal income tax of the benefits of employer-provided van pools and public transportation fringe benefits encourages commuting methods that may contribute to the spread
of disease, but the exclusion of employer-provided parking for individual cars has the
opposite effect. Similarly, the effect of the exclusion from taxable income of the benefits of
employer-provided onsite gyms may depend on what the alternative is to an employer gym.
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Federal excise taxes influence not only labor supply but also other aspects of behavior
that affect the rate of disease transmission. For example, the federal gasoline tax discourages commuting by automobile, thereby encouraging the use of public transportation
(though given its very low rate compared to other countries, the U.S. gas tax is notable
mostly by its absence). And to the extent that alcohol is an important component of
social gatherings at bars, events, and private parties, alcohol taxes discourage these
opportunities for disease transmission.
Certain federal tax provisions famously encourage owner-occupied housing, including
the availability of home mortgage interest deductions and the exclusion of most capital
gains on sales of primary residences. While these provisions apply to condominiums as
well as stand-alone housing, they generally have the effect of encouraging low-density
living arrangements. Similarly, the (limited) availability of home-office deductions not
only encourages private home ownership but also discourages workplace attendance,
and the associated proximity to others.
The bottom right panel of Table 1 lists federal tax provisions that facilitate access to
health care that may limit the spread and severity of disease. The first is the tax deduction for medical expenses exceeding an adjusted gross income threshold, and the second
is the federal tax exclusion of the benefits of employer-provided medical insurance.
Together these provisions encourage employers to offer medical insurance as a fringe
benefit of employment and make it feasible for patients to afford medical treatments.
The federal government also offers employers tax credits for providing paid family and
medical leave, which encourages the provision of such leave and thereby reduces the
likelihood of disease transmission by employees who feel unwell but who might otherwise face strong financial pressures to continue to go to work. Active duty and retired
military personnel receive medical benefits that are excluded from taxable income, and
lower-income taxpayers are eligible for tax credits equal to portions of their premiums
for medical insurance purchased through the health insurance marketplace created by
the Affordable Care Act (ACA). These provisions encourage greater availability and
take-up of medical treatment by portions of the population that might not otherwise
have these options. And the availability of health savings accounts reduces the after-tax
cost of providing a form of self-insurance for future medical spending needs.
The picture that emerges from this thumbnail survey of federal tax provisions is one of a
system that prods the economy generally in the direction of efficient resource allocation in
the presence of communicable disease. To be sure, the incentives created by federal taxes
are not finely tuned to the problem at hand, nor do they point uniformly in the direction of
discouraging workplace and other population density that is most associated with disease
transmission. But it is noteworthy that a tax system designed largely without regard to
the potential for viral infection nonetheless has the effect of modifying the behavior of
individuals and businesses in ways that generally work against the spread of disease. This
consideration argues in favor of temporary tax increases while the danger of community
infection remains, and it highlights the idea that any tax reductions adopted on other
grounds are apt to encourage risky behavior. While this survey focuses on federal taxes,
state and local taxes create similar incentives and might be more finely honed to local
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disease conditions. Indeed, the case for higher taxes is perhaps even stronger for state and
local governments, which face enormous budgetary pressures from spending demands
and revenue declines and are less capable of borrowing than is the federal government.
Many of the economic measures introduced by governments at the beginning of the
pandemic helped further limit labor supply and consumption in large groups. Supplementary unemployment insurance made it unnecessary for many to work during that
time, especially those with lower incomes. Lump sum payments to households likely
also reduced labor supply. Bans on specific activities reduced contagion in crowded
environments. Business loan schemes and wage supports, conditional on job guarantees,
allowed individuals and businesses to temporarily halt operations with reduced fear that
doing so would negatively impact their future economic prospects. However, many of
these policies are designed to be short lived. Some propose that at their expiration they
be replaced with measures designed to stimulate hiring and economic activity, such as
payroll subsidies. The logic of this paper suggests that some caution is warranted until
the pandemic subsides, since such changes would push in the wrong direction from the
point of view of limiting spread of the disease.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of a deadly and previously unknown communicable disease demands
swift administrative action on the part of governments. Once the immediate crisis passes,
it is prudent to consider the most cost-effective means of addressing the lingering
problems created by a pandemic. Tax policies can be used to create flexible incentives
for individuals and businesses and, for that reason, are routinely deployed to control
environmental and other externalities. They can be similarly used to control the spread
of disease. Furthermore, taxes raise revenue that governments need to finance health
expenditures and transfers to those hardest hit by the economic fallout of a pandemic.
U.S. tax policy already takes steps in this direction, but with purposeful design, it could
do much more to address some of the challenges created by widespread transmission
of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. It is undoubtedly difficult to forge political compromises
over new tax policies during the outbreak of a major disease, but the alternatives to
thoughtful tax policy are typically much less efficient and less likely to address the
nation’s problems in a comprehensive and sustainable way.
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Appendix A: Employer Taxes—Technical Details
The economic profits of a representative firm are given by
(A1)

π = (1− τ ){q( L, K ) − [w + (1− α )x]L}− ρ K − α xL.

With a utilitarian social welfare function, total social welfare in this model (W) is simply the sum
of firm profits, the externality, and tax revenue:
(A2)

W = π + h( L, x) +

τ
(π + ρ K + α xL).
1− τ

An increase in the after-tax rate has the following effect on this objective:
(A3)

dW
∂Q dK
∂h( L, x) dL
∂h( L, x) dx
=
+
+τ
d(1− τ )
∂K d(1− τ )
∂L d(1− τ )
∂x d(1− τ )
⎡ ∂Q
⎤ dL
dx
+τ ⎢
− (w + (1− α )x) ⎥
+ τ [ f ′(x) − (1− α )]
L.
d(1− τ )
⎣ ∂L
⎦ d(1− τ )

Next, the firm’s first-order conditions for capital, labor, and disease mitigation are
(A4)

∂Q
α
= w + (1− α )x +
x
(1− τ )
∂L

(A5)

∂Q
ρ
=
∂K (1− τ )

(A6)

f ′(x) = 1− α +

α
.
(1− τ )

Finally, if the tax is set optimally, there can be no effect on welfare when it is changed slightly.
dW
The equation for the optimal tax, therefore, is obtained by setting
= 0 and then substituting
d(1− τ )
in the three firm first-order conditions. Doing so yields
(A7)

⎡ ρ
∂h( L, x) dL
dK
α
d(xL) ⎤
∂h( L, x) dx
+
+τ ⎢
+
⎥=0.
∂L d(1− τ )
∂x d(1− τ )
⎣ (1− τ ) d(1− τ ) (1− τ ) d(1− τ ) ⎦

Rearranging this condition produces the optimal tax formula presented in Equation (6).
Appendix B: Now and Then—Technical Details
Suppose the economy is comprised of individuals with utility functions of the following form:
σ

(B1)

⎛ N σ −1 ⎞ σ −1
u(ci , Li ,Δ i ) = ⎜ ∑ q j σ ⎟ + u* ( Li ,Δ i ) .
⎝ j=1
⎠
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For any given level of income, Y, the consumer chooses a consumption bundle by solving the
following problem:
σ

(B2)

N
⎛ N σ −1 ⎞ σ −1
max ⎜ ∑ q j σ ⎟ ,s.t.∑ pq j ≤ Y .
⎝ j=1
⎠
j=1

This yields the following demand function for each good:
(B3)

−1

⎛ N σ −1 ⎞ σ −1
q ⎜ ∑ q jσ ⎟ = λ p ,
⎝ j=1
⎠
−1
σ
j

where λ is the multiplier on the individual’s budget constraint.
Since all prices are identical, individuals consume the same amount of each good and their
indirect consumption subutility function is
(B4)

1
⎛Y⎞
v(Y , p, N ) = N σ −1 ⎜ ⎟ .
⎝ p⎠

Differentiating the right side of Equation (B4) with respect to Y yields the individual’s marginal
utility of income. Since this is identical across individuals, aggregation produces Equation (9).

